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Abstract 
The article advances a threefold theoretical contribution using a System, Society and 
Dominance (SSD) effects framework to show how and why sustainable management-
labour workplace partnerships are a chimera. First, managers (employers) find it 
increasingly difficult to keep workplace bargains with employees (unions) due to 
increasingly neo-liberal ‘system’ effects associated with capitalism as a globalized 
accumulation model. Second, workplace mutuality will be rare because of ‘society’ 
level effects under voluntarism. Third, ‘dominance’ effects arising from the power of 
dominant economies and their multinational corporations can inhibit workplace 
mutuality. Drawing on empirical case study data from Ireland, the future prognosis of 
management-labour collaboration under neo-liberal work regimes is discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
With the decline in collective bargaining and union density in most ‘English-speaking’ 
liberal market economies (LMEs), the concepts of mutuality and cooperative labour-
management partnership at the workplace have attracted attention from management 
scholars, practitioners and policy-makers for some time (Gunnigle, 1998; Guest and Peccei, 
2001; Kochan et al., 2008; Brewster et al., 2014; Danford et al., 2014; Johnstone, 2014). 
The concept of mutuality describes the desired outcome of the practices management use to 
engage workers, both directly as individuals and indirectly through employee 
representatives, to create shared benefits for both parties (Cullinane et al., 2014). The 
specific mechanisms commonly associated with workplace partnership are highly variable, 
but generally include indirect cooperation between management and employee 
representatives; parallel direct employee involvement via teamwork and other voice 
mechanisms; and bundles of complementary Human Resource Management (HRM) 
practices, notably financial participation, employment security and training (Kochan et al., 
2008; Johnstone and Ackers, 2014; Wilkinson et al., 2014).  
 
A rationale to evaluate collaborative labour-management partnership has been advanced by 
Budd (2004), including, specifically, processes that can help mediate ‘efficiency, equity and 
voice’ in the employment relationship on an enduring basis (Johnstone et al., 2010). While 
the priorities of employers are invariably efficiency related, this needs to be balanced with 
equity (employment standards and fair treatment) and meaningful worker voice (employees 
have an input into decisions affecting them). In view of this, partnership arrangements 
involving trade unions are commonly seen as more robust and facilitative of a wider 
pluralist understanding of mutuality than might be encountered in non-union work regimes; 
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for instance, because institutional power-sharing and independence from management is 
more likely (Cullinane et al., 2014).   
 
Employee participation arrangements in economies like Ireland, the UK, Australia and the 
United States (US) are subject to particular liberal market pressures that underscore the 
significance of forces affecting actor choice (Marchington, 2015). Crucially, in the context 
of voluntarist industrial relations, employer choice remains the primary source of authority 
to initiate workplace partnership. Therefore, ideas surrounding ‘mutuality’, ‘labour 
management partnership’, and ‘voluntarism’, are not static entities but part of an unfolding 
dynamic shaped as much by the relative power of parties and contextual forces (Rittau and 
Dundon, 2010; Marchington, 2015). With the global economic downturn of recent years 
affecting many economies, the theme of mutuality is often recast, with a focus on relative 
distribution of pain rather than equalising of cooperative gain (Kaufman, 2014). This article 
contributes to both the theory and practice of mutuality under contemporary neo-liberal 
modes of capitalist accumulation (McDonough and Dundon, 2010; McDonough et al., 2010; 
Thompson, 2013). In so doing it responds to calls to move ‘beyond’ an enterprise focus on 
HRM (Delbridge et al., 2011). It also moves beyond now stagnant debates concerning 
winners versus losers of partnership. The article further engages with related debates in this 
journal on how environmental contextual forces impact upon organizational strategies, firm 
capabilities and workplace relationship dynamics (see for instance Conway et al., 2014; 
Witcher and Chau, 2012; Wood and Budhwar, 2014).   
 
Reflecting on case study evidence, the analysis shows how the interplay of various forces 
serve to undermine workplace-level collaboration. In short, sustained partnership is a 
chimera: that is an illusion and figment of aspirational theoretical imagination. Indeed, even 
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within robust integrative arrangements that involve well-established trade unions, strategies 
for mutuality faltered. The contribution advances that sustained labour-management 
collaboration is largely a delusion, because of three interrelated conditions. First, managers 
have difficulty supporting workplace deals with employees due to external global neo-
liberal economic pressures. Second, under State-sponsored voluntarist policies, cooperative 
mutuality will be rare given absence of regulations to engender support for innovative and 
inclusive workplace practices. Finally, the power of dominant economies and their 
multinational corporations often overshadows local managerial initiative for strategic 
choice. The article’s contribution provides insights relevant to other neo-liberal contexts - 
such as the UK, USA or Australia - where durability of voluntarist mutuality remains a key 
academic and public policy concern (Boxall, 2013; Wilkinson et al., 2014; Marchington, 
2015).  
 
The article is structured as follows. Next we review literature and build theory related to the 
System, Society and Dominance (SSD) effects framework, and associated conditions 
affecting the potential longevity of workplace collaboration, to advance three propositions: 
i) System effects associated with stages of globalized capitalist accumulation will mean 
there is high probability that managers, even when they want to, will find it difficult to 
honour workplace bargains owing to external forces; ii) Society effects associated with the 
national role of the State regarding voluntarist regulation and weak institutional constraints 
will inhibit the capacity of management-employee mutuality to grow and endure in practice; 
and iii), Dominance effects stemming from the powerful role of dominant economies and 
their multinational corporations, in particular American MNCs, will encourage managers to 
choose alternative individualistic HRM rather than collective (partnership) forms of labour-
management collaboration. Section 3 explains the research setting to examine these 
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propositions along with the methodological rationale. Section 4 assesses the importance of 
environmental and context forces (macro and micro) shaping the durability of collaborative 
mutuality in the case study firms. Finally, the discussion considers the future prognosis for 
workplace cooperation under modes of neo-liberal capitalist accumulation.   
 
2. System, Society and Dominance (SSD) effects on workplace mutuality  
It is important for management scholars to unpick how comparative contextual conditions 
across multiple levels promote and prevent organisational strategies for cooperative 
dialogue (Whitcher and Chau, 2012; Wood et al., 2014; Marchington, 2015). In this section 
we review existing literature exploring the broader conditions affecting longevity of 
collaborative mutuality.  
 
SSD theory is deployed as an overarching framework (Smith and Meiksins, 1995), using 
the Republic of Ireland as a contextual example, to analyse the propositions. The SSD 
framework allows a multi-level analysis of how workplace partnership can be shaped but 
not determined by three interacting pressures: i) the dynamic structure of capitalism as a 
global economic accumulation system; ii) mediating national-level State institutions exert a 
society effect on workplace actions; and iii), the dominance effect of powerful economies 
and multinational corporations (Smith and Meiksins, 1995; Delbridge et al., 2011; Edwards 
et al., 2013).      
 
i) System effects: fragility of workplace bargains under disconnected capitalism 
The first part of the framework concerns analysis of the stages of globalized capitalist 
accumulation (McDonough et al., 2010) and attendant systemic effects on the (in)stability 
of long-term management-labour relations. Capitalism as an economic system sets various 
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contradictory ‘parameters and constraints on organisational choice’, but does not directly 
determine such choices (Smith and Meiksins, 1995:253). These systemic pressures have 
been reinforced by an apparently increasing hegemonic ideology of neo-liberalism, 
marketization and financialization (Thompson, 2013; Hauptmeier and Vidal, 2014). 
 
With regard to Ireland, for example, the consequence of its exposure to global market 
forces and its high dependence on multinational capital is that employers can easily renege 
on workplace bargains struck with employees. This echoes Thompson’s (2013) view that 
there are powerful tensions inherent in capitalism which exacerbate disunity between 
institutions, corporate governance arrangements, actors and employment regulations, 
thereby unravelling cohesiveness. Given these acute structural tensions, Thompson (2013) 
observes that actors within liberal market regimes find it increasingly difficult to make 
connections between collaborative objectives in the spheres of work and employment. 
Consequently, managers find it much harder to keep their side of not only the explicit 
transactional (negotiated) deal, but also the implicit (psychological) side of the work-effort 
exchange (Cullinane and Dundon, 2006). The instabilities generated by what Thompson 
(2013) terms ‘disconnected capitalism’ are evident in the Irish context, where the 
institutional configuration of national collaboration (e.g. social partnership) and voluntarist 
workplace mutuality confronted the excesses of a global neo-liberal economic paradigm. 
Tensions between minimal workplace regulation and managerial prerogative suggest that 
there is a high probability managers may renege on bargains generated with employees 
even under work regimes designed for collaborative mutuality. To this end Proposition 1 is 
formulated thus: 
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Proposition 1: There is a high risk probability that managers (employers) will 
find it increasingly difficult to keep workplace bargains with employees (unions) 
under an increasingly disconnected capitalist system.  
 
ii) Society effects: voluntarism and weak regulatory constraints   
Capitalism has systemic generalizable properties and pressures for accumulation, but they 
are embedded within and mediated by institutional variation and different national political 
economies (Smith and Meiksins, 1995; Delbridge et al., 2011; Hauptmeier and Vidal, 
2014). Therefore, rather than universal patterns arising from capitalist accumulation 
pressures, ‘societal effects’ on capital-labour relations at firm level will vary across 
countries; depending, for example, on variation in institutional pathways and competitive 
postures in different countries. The role of the State is crucial here.   
 
Societal effects on workplace partnerships in Ireland, for example, are shaped by a 
preference for voluntarism rather than statutory regulation regarding governance of 
workplace and economic issues (Dobbins, 2010). Ireland developed a national-level 
consensus-oriented bargaining arrangement between 1987-2009, whereby the social 
partner’s negotiated pay, tax rates and other economic and social issues through successive 
national agreements. Social partnership subsequently collapsed in late 2009 after the then 
government imposed austerity measures in response to a failed banking system 
(McDonough and Dundon, 2010; Roche, 2013). The institutional linkage between national 
partnership and workplace mutuality was formulated through public policies designed to 
diffuse enterprise collaboration on a voluntary basis. National framework agreements 
avoided prescribing the scope of partnership or the range of issues that could be addressed 
at the workplace. A tripartite National Centre for Partnership and Performance (NCPP) was 
specifically introduced with a remit to diffuse partnerships at workplace level; however, the 
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NCPP was disbanded in 2010 amidst public sector reforms. The reality is that despite 
experimentation with collaborative practices, empirical evidence points out that the 
diffusion of workplace partnership was and remains limited (Roche and Teague, 2014).    
 
Collaborative mutuality through partnership may be rare but can develop where there is 
support from senior management; when competitive postures are oriented towards 
innovation, knowledge, and skilled workers; there exists advanced capital-intensive 
technology; and where employers introduce complementary ‘bundles’ of cooperative work 
practices that fit value-added competitive postures based on quality competition (Murray et 
al., 2002; Belanger and Edwards, 2007; Dobbins and Gunnigle, 2009). Therefore, voluntary 
collaborative regimes are feasible; albeit in very specific circumstances. What is more 
common, as Godard (2004) suggests, is unilateral management prerogative or weak 
employee involvement given the emphasis on cost-minimization and labour-intensive 
competition. In such contexts, robust workplace partnership will only be adopted by 
employers when seen as economically advantageous.   
 
Institutional complementarity is an important factor affecting mutual collaboration: 
institutions are complementary if the presence of one institution enhances efficiency of 
others (Streeck, 1997; Hancke et al., 2007). Yet, even prior to the collapse of national level 
partnership, Ireland lacked what Hancke et al., (2007:5) note is the all important 
architecture of ‘institutional comparative advantage’. By this is meant an institutional 
complementarity across societal levels. Importantly, such complementarity determines the 
degree to which an economy is coordinated in pursuit of a redistribution of wealth, power, 
risk and competitiveness. Long before its sudden economic recession, Ireland gravitated 
towards a promiscuous neo-liberal regime more akin to the US free market system than the 
coordinated equity and voice orientation of the European social democratic tradition (Roche, 
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2007). A consequence is that while the Irish model displayed elements of cooperative 
collaboration during the ‘social partnership era’, the pervasiveness of laissez-faire 
capitalism resulted in an imbalance of benefits distributed to capital at the expense of 
labour. 
 
Streeck (1997) takes the idea of institutional complementarity further by introducing the 
concept of ‘beneficial constraints’, relevant at a broader societal level. According to Streeck 
(1997: 197), contrary to arguments that economic performance improves when labour 
market regulations are removed, ‘socially institutionalized constraints on the rational 
voluntarism of interest maximizing behaviour may be economically beneficial’. The notion 
is that beneficial constraints, like statutory provision for works councils or co-determination 
in States like Germany, can improve economic performance when society intervenes in 
market activity to limit the unfettered pursuit of profit-maximisation. Streeck (2004: 426) 
explains how ‘institutions clearly not created with economic efficiency in mind, may turn 
out to be sources of superior economic performance and competitiveness’. In contrast, 
voluntarist collaboration sponsored by employers is impeded by contradictory pressures 
pushing management towards cost-cutting and unilateral actions. Even the most temporary 
alteration from cooperative relations can be counterproductive as employees question 
management credibility: ‘the mere possibility of defection, as is by definition inherent in 
any voluntary arrangement, can damage the positive effects of workplace cooperation’ 
(Streeck, 1997: 201).  
 
Accordingly, scholars have suggested that in societies that display enduring voluntary 
institutional path dependency, management-labour collaborations are feasible but rare 
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(Belanger and Edwards, 2007; McLaughlin, 2013). Arguably, stronger beneficial 
constraints in the form of proactive State regulation may be a necessary condition for 
sustainable cooperation to be diffused more widely to workplace levels. Therefore, in the 
absence of harder regulatory ‘beneficial constraints’, exemplars of robust and enduring 
enterprise collaboration will tend to be small and isolated islands in liberal economies 
(McLaughlin, 2013). From the above discussion, the following proposition has been 
formulated: 
Proposition 2: Workplace mutuality will be rare because of the societal 
institutional effects of voluntarism and minimal regulation on employer actions. 
 
iii) Dominance effects: powerful economies and multinational corporations 
Dominance effects relate to the power resources possessed by dominant economies and 
multinational corporations in shaping institutions and workplace practice in other nation 
states (Smith and Meiksins, 1995; Edwards et al., 2013). Delbridge et al. (2011:499) 
comment how workplace social relations in local subsidiaries of multinationals may be 
shaped by the parent company via corporate influence. Since the 1960s, institutions and 
workplace practices in Ireland have been heavily shaped by the dominance effects of the 
United States and reliance on foreign direct investment (FDI) from multinational 
corporations. This has impacted upon the limited diffusion of, in particular, labour 
management partnerships, because US multinationals have exported what are widely seen 
as exemplars of individualist HRM policies which, together, militate against collectivist 
work regimes (Gunnigle, 1995; Scullion et al., 2007).   
 
Therefore, for the past fifty years, successive Irish governments of all political persuasions 
have prioritized a policy of economic liberalisation. The centrepiece of Irish political 
 11 
economy, seemingly driving other policy areas, is the overriding concern to attract and 
retain foreign direct investment from multinational corporations, from the US above all 
(Collings et al., 2008). Evidently, American multinational corporations exert substantial 
power over public policy, to the extent that successive Irish governments have avoided 
placing many constraints on the decision-making prerogative of big business. The role of 
the US as a dominant economy and the power of multinational corporations (American and 
others) has interacted with system and society effects, throwing up various tensions in 
industrial relations (Gunnigle, 1995). The effect of attracting multinational capital into a 
complementary neo-liberal market regime was underpinned by State sponsorship via low 
corporation tax and minimal employment regulation (McDonough and Dundon, 2010). The 
extent to which multinational capital utilises Ireland as a channel for global tax avoidance 
and tax minimisation agreements is now widely known, with exclusive arrangements made 
with American corporations by the Irish government (Stewart, 2013; Houlder et al., 2014). 
 
Given these dominance effects, statutory supports for workplace partnership were not 
pursued due to fear of frightening away US multinationals, who tend to object to any form 
of collectivist labour market regulation. For this reason, social partnership in Ireland was 
rooted in the continuation of a voluntarist tradition with minimal statutory employment 
rights. One stark contradiction arising from this was the inclusion of trade unions in macro-
economic governance through national partnership, yet the simultaneous refusal to legislate 
for statutory trade union recognition rights for collective bargaining at the workplace 
(Dundon and Collings, 2011). Employment rights that do exist at workplace level were 
often begrudgingly legislated for only in response to mandatory European Directives, and 
then usually transposed in a ‘light touch’ manner. Notable in this regard is that the Irish 
government colluded with representatives of multinational capital to ensure a minimalist 
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national transposition of the EU Information & Consultation of Employees (ICE) Directive, 
which limited the diffusion of workplace mutuality (Dundon et al., 2014). Proposition 3 has 
been developed from the above discussion of Dominance effects:  
 
Proposition 3: Dominance effects associated with the power of dominant 
economies and multinational corporations further restricts workplace 
mutuality. 
 
3. Research Methods and Case Study Organizations 
A multiple case study methodology was used to capture the diversity of workplace 
practices, occupational coverage, market variation and sector difference in Ireland. The 
research design collected and analysed data on a range of employee-union-management 
cooperative behaviours, including questions related to the perceived strength and durability 
of mutuality over time. Data collection and analysis was organized around the three 
propositions, notably the interplay between external (macro) and internal (micro) factors 
affecting strength and durability of workplace partnership arrangements. The format of the 
questions was tailored by whether the respondents were managers, union representatives or 
workers. For example, senior managers were asked if there were any tensions or pressures 
affecting the strength of partnership in terms of its capacity to deal with contentious issues 
and reconcile divergent interests. Likewise, workers and union stewards were asked 
questions about the usefulness of partnership forums for advancing employee and union 
concerns. The aim was to ‘bring to life’ real world incidents supporting and/or inhibiting 
mutuality. Six case studies were included in the final selection based on prior public 
knowledge about their collaborative practices. All six case study organisations had also 
been publically endorsed as leading exemplars of best practice partnership in Ireland by the 
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then government agency responsible for the promotion of mutual gains collaboration, the 
NCPP. As such, the six cases represented, at least at face value, evidence of strong and 
effective labour-management collaboration. All six were also unionised, which offered the 
potential to subject both union and employer practice concerning collaboration to critical 
scrutiny. 
 
The case organizations 
Four of the six cases are manufacturing and two service sector companies. A condition of 
research access was that the companies remain anonymous and all have been given 
pseudonyms. Manufacturing A is a continuous process single product plant that 
commenced trading in 1983. It employs 435 people and 70% of the total workforce is 
unionized (all process operatives are union members). Manufacturing B employs 1600 
people and has 100% union density. Manufacturing C employs 85 people and is also 100% 
unionized. Manufacturing D was a highly unionized indigenous company which employed 
1700 people when the research began, although employment levels shrank dramatically and 
the company went into receivership amidst global economic crisis. Of the two services 
sector cases, Hospitality E employs 480 staff and is 75% unionized, while Finance F 
employs 600 staff with 94% of the workforce unionized. Each case is a plant of a private 
sector multinational organisation. 
 
Data collection and analysis 
The research provided access at all levels in the case organizations, including middle and 
senior managers, union representatives, and employees. The research also incorporated a 
longitudinal element with case organisations visited over a three year period, between 2007 
and 2009, prior to the collapse of national partnership in Ireland. In addition to semi-
structured interviews during the primary research stage, an element of ethnographic non-
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participant observation was possible, which further reinforced interview findings. Extensive 
documentary material was also utilised, such as personnel or relevant HR policies. A total 
of 126 individuals were interviewed: 42 managers from all levels; 34 union representatives, 
including shop stewards, partnership facilitators and union officials; and 50 employees 
(which included several focus groups with an average of 8 employees per group).  
 
Data analysis followed a structured thematic approach in relation to the SSD framework 
and how macro-level forces shaped micro-level outcomes. For example, themes relating to 
‘system’ effects were explored when asking respondents questions about possible changes 
to collaborative workplace cooperation arising from say market or economic conditions. 
Likewise, possible ‘societal’ effect linkages were drawn when asking questions about the 
perceived utility with voluntary forms of participation and employee voice regulation in the 
case organisations, and from among different respondent types. Further thematic data 
analysis was made in relation to potential ‘dominance’ effects when asking respondents 
about the influence of ‘individualist’ (Americanized) HRM policies, as well as questions 
concerning multinational corporate head office strategy. The thematic structure also 
allowed for analysis of pertinent micro level configurational factors (unionisation, employer 
perceptions of risk, role of partnership champions, business strategy, market pressures, use 
of advanced technologies, among other potential micro influences).  
 
Finally, a stage to ensure validity of the data and its analysis was employed. For example, 
coding was applied to emergent thematic issues described above. These were checked and 
re-checked by both researchers. In addition, a follow-up stage was adopted for verification 
purposes using secondary sources and telephone conversations/email correspondence with 
respondents, to check issues and developments since the initial primary research stages. 
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4. Findings 
The case study data is presented in relation to the SSD framework effects. These show how 
a complex interplay of contextual external (macro) and internal (micro) environmental 
forces mediate workplace partnership across the six organizations.  
 
Macro-level environmental forces 
System effects and the fragility of workplace bargains: Our case evidence illustrates how 
the fragility of collaborative enterprise bargains constrains mutuality and in some cases 
results in the actual collapse of partnership; often linked to acute vulnerability to systemic 
global market forces. For example, longer-term cooperation at Manufacturing B, C and D 
ceased in the face of management responses to competitive pressures. Unions at these three 
plants, meanwhile, faced concession bargaining with pay freezes and cost-cutting which 
entailed redundancies and reduced pension benefits. The partnership forum collapsed at 
Manufacturing C due to a very difficult economic climate and a subsequent slump in profits, 
which led to compulsory redundancies. In Manufacturing D, meanwhile, a partnership 
committee designed to embed mutual collaboration collapsed due to acute global market 
pressures. A deterioration in the company’s competitiveness culminated in substantial job 
losses, cost-cutting, pay freezes and outsourcing. Cooperation was not sufficiently 
institutionalized to survive ‘pivotal events’ relating to economic crisis and senior 
management turnover. In short, the conditions supporting cooperation at Manufacturing D 
were too weak to counteract the pressures undermining it, even in what was formerly 
regarded as a robust collaborative regime. Above all, the data illustrates the difficulty of 
sustaining cooperation in the face of environmental turbulence coupled with liberalized 
regulation. Manufacturing D went into receivership in 2009 and subsequently re-opened on 
 16 
a much smaller-scale in 2010 under the ownership of American venture capitalist investors. 
Workers were not blind to system effect uncertainty: 
 
“Trust is not great. You would wonder are they going to close the place altogether. 
They can make the product cheaper elsewhere. None of us know what the top 
management are planning at the end of the day” (employee operator, Manufacturing D). 
 
Societal effects and voluntary regulation: The voluntarist nature of regulation was evidently 
linked to government policies which allowed employers to decide whether to engage in 
labour-management partnership practices or not, and if so, under what arrangements. The 
State explicitly preferred voluntarist framework agreements with a ‘soft’ supportive 
institutional environment (e.g. the NCPP) rather than legally mandated worker participation 
rights. In short, the State socially engineered a societal culture founded on voluntary 
regulation and minimal legislation not only for its industrial relations regime, but also 
broader macroeconomic and social welfare changes.  
 
Societal effects permeated workplace actions. In all our cases, management made the major 
decisions about whether to create or sustain collaborative structures and processes. 
Workplace cooperation was often dependent on management goodwill to ensure that 
practices flourished. In Manufacturing C and Hospitality E, for example, management 
dominated the agenda and scope of issues subject to collaborative engagement with 
workers (unions). In Financial Services F, the union was excluded from a contractual 
change under the transfer of undertakings regulations when some staff moved to another 
employer. When management decided to sell one part of the business, the decision was 
announced without involving employees or their union. This single event exposed the 
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inability of the union to counter the power of management to make unilateral decisions in 
response to market conditions. At Manufacturing B, union representatives viewed the 
partnership forum as being invited in as a “guest” of management, and that partnership took 
place on the employers’ terms. Employee respondents commented that they felt there was 
insufficient consultation about various issues, that their concerns were not being adequately 
addressed, and that management appeared to ‘pay lip service’ to consultation fora. A senior 
union representative remarked: 
 
“where workers’ …. concerns are not given due weight, disenchantment begins to 
creep in. It does illustrate that real partnership has to be a partnership of equals”. 
 
Apart from the minor quibbles many managers often raise about regulations, red tape, or 
European Directives, there was little compulsion to share power with other workplace 
stakeholders over the longer-term. Collaborative mutuality was subject to minimal statutory 
regulation and management could opt to exit such arrangements quite easily. The State 
preferred not to prescribe what partnership should look like in practice, and the emphasis 
was on encouraging voluntarist mutuality though the auspices of national framework 
agreements. Consequently, even at the cases that evidenced robust cooperation (e.g. 
Manufacturing A and Finance F), union representatives called for consultation to be given a 
stronger footing through more formal structures. In the Financial Services case study, 
institutional support for union recognition was something union officials would prefer, 
linking the idea to comparable health and safety rights, rather than premised on the 
goodwill of managerial prerogative.  
 
Dominance effects: 
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In conjunction with both System and Societal effects above, the case organizations were 
influenced by Dominance effects. Of paramount significance in this regard was the power 
of dominant economies, multinational organisations and host country (or HQ) influences, to 
shape workplace practice. All the multinational organizations – both of US and non-US 
origin - had introduced what can be described as idealised ‘best practice’ individualist 
HRM policies in their Irish operations which, in some cases, encroached and undermined 
relations with unions. Dominance effects were in part transmitted through staunch 
opposition, especially by US multinationals, to forms of collective or ‘hard’ labour market 
regulation; notably, opposition to statutory trade union recognition legislation and 
mandatory works council legislation. The broader ramification of these Dominance effects 
is an espoused reluctance for mandated workplace mutuality, such as statutory partnership 
or work councils. Even in the strongest or most robust case, Manufacturing A, unions 
wanted to see more institutional support for their voice and were somewhat wary about 
employer endorsement of individual HRM type practices that tended to undermine 
collective bargaining and workforce solidarity. 
 
Micro-level context factors 
In our cases, micro-level factors tended to be insufficient to protect and sustain partnerships 
in the face of the macro level factors above. The balance tended to be skewed towards 
management’s search for efficiency, and less on equity and independent employee voice. 
Manufacturing A was a rare example of robust and enduring partnership, with supportive 
props at micro level in the face of what seem like apparently countervailing SSD effects, as 
reported above.   
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Value-added quality competition and advanced technology are important factors for 
incubating collaborative mutuality. For example, continuous process technology at 
Manufacturing A presented favourable conditions for problem-solving employee forums, 
semi-autonomous teamwork and gainsharing, that were championed through a partnership 
committee. This in turn enhanced the durability of cooperation, and management were also 
less likely to relocate such an expensive capital-intensive plant. An electrician illustrated 
this point at Manufacturing A: “the good thing about this place is they cannot move it”.  
 
Balance of risk and power (dis)equilibrium: Another important micro factor affecting 
durability of collaboration is whether the respective parties can take the appropriate risks 
and reach the necessary power equilibriums necessary for arrangements to endure in the 
longer-term. The (temporary) breakdown of collaboration at Manufacturing B due to 
worker (union) disenchantment illustrates the difficulty of sustaining power compromises. 
In this case cooperative dialogue and mutual problem-solving was abandoned because it 
could not resolve the more distributive as opposed to integrative bargaining issues; in 
particular disagreement about pension reform. Subsequent to the pension issue the parties 
tended to disagree about what was a collaborative type of issue and what was a more 
conflictual bargaining matter. In the end the preserve of managerial prerogative dominated 
as some decisions were unilaterally imposed. The resultant power dis-equilibrium led to the 
(temporary) breakdown of collaboration, and conflicts of interest were referred to external 
third party mediation (the Labour Relations Commission). Workplace cooperation was 
subsequently recalibrated at Manufacturing B when a new Information and Consultation 
Forum was introduced – partly in response to the transposed Information and Consultation 
of Employees Act 2006. In Finance F also, it was reported by union stewards that 
supervisors would hold back information until it was perceived to be too late for the union 
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or employees to object to proposed changes to working practice. One union representative 
remarked: 
 
“individuals [line managers] are not comfortable sharing information ... they 
wait until it’s [new change initiative] almost ready to happen before they share it” 
 
Agency and unionisation: The presence and strength of workplace trade unionism 
(evidenced by high union density and independence from management) was a significant 
factor in all six cases. Indeed, the cases were selected because they were publicly known to 
advocate partnership, were heralded as exemplars of union-management cooperation, and 
had been endorsed by the State agency responsible for promoting workplace level 
partnerships at the time, the NCPP. Importantly, the union role was often qualified by 
managers in terms of what value it could add to the company. A senior manager at 
Manufacturing A explained: 
 
“We saw that the adversarial way couldn’t continue. Unions represent 70 per cent 
of the workforce, so there is no way the plant could thrive under adversarialism. So 
it was seen that the way forward was in partnership”. 
 
In addition, while most trade union actors were receptive to new industrial relations 
approaches incorporating integrative problem-solving, they also realised that management 
remained the dominant agent. Even under robust collaborative regimes, the union role 
could be undermined, with union representatives explaining that they were not involved in 
some decisions or that the nature of managerial change was too contentious for the union to 
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support. One example was the pension reform in Manufacturing B, noted above, which led 
to the temporary collapse of the union-management dialogue forum. In other cases, a 
similar dynamic resulted in members feeling detached from their union when collaborative 
processes were either by-passed by managements’ unilateral decision-making, or the issue 
could not be resolved to the satisfaction of workers. In Financial Services case F, for 
instance, management decided to sell part of the business and failed to consult the union (or 
employees) prior to the announcement. Union representatives explained that such events 
would make it difficult to sell partnership to workers, as the shop steward in Finance firm F 
remarked: 
 
“When decisions like that are made and you are not aware of them, the first 
thing that is going to be thrown at you by your members is ‘Where is your 
partnership now’. It’s very hard to explain” 
 
Robust or shallow ‘institutionalization’ of collaborative processes: Cooperation and 
collaboration were more likely to appear sustainable in cases where seemingly robust 
internal institutionalization of vertically aligned stakeholder governance models supported 
proactive worker and union contributions to company performance (e.g. encompassing 
information-sharing, financial stakeholding, employee participation, and training). In 
Manufacturing firm A, and Finance F, a range of structures facilitated collaborative 
mutuality vertically, from top to bottom. At Manufacturing A, for instance, unions and 
managers agreed a bundle of complementary mutual gains practices: semi-autonomous 
teamwork, regular informal management–union information-sharing and consultation, 
annualized hours, gainsharing, single status conditions, training, and an employment 
security clause. In Finance F, notwithstanding the situation referred to above when unions 
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were not consulted about selling part of the business, there were regular opportunities to 
discuss company merger issues, with in-built confidentiality clauses to prevent information 
being leaked externally. Across these relatively robust cases informal dialogue featured 
prominently. For example, a series of issue-based teams were established in Manufacturing 
A to examine emergent business and employment issues, the most significant of which was 
known as a ‘Business Performance Improvement’ (BPI) team. The BPI team provided 
unions with input into strategic decision-making, particularly in formulating five-year 
business plans. Management also enhanced direct (rather than collective or representative) 
participation by introducing semi-autonomous teams that institutionalized considerable 
autonomy over work tasks at the point of production.  
 
In contrast, internal institutionalization of collaboration at Manufacturing B and D and 
Hospitality E was shallow in terms of scale and scope, mostly restricted to formal bodies 
that gravitated around indirect management-union forums. This formalisation of structures 
was not sufficiently institutionalized at each company. For instance, there was considerably 
less scope for direct employee participation than there was at Manufacturing A. 
Cooperation eventually broke down in Manufacturing B and D due to a combination of 
external competitive pressures and shallow internal institutionalization. 
 
Regarding strength of workplace institutions for management-worker collaboration across 
the case studies, the scope of issues tended to span low-level operational type issues, with 
some higher-level strategic business matters. Of particular importance is how formal 
structures differed across workplaces, which affected the ability of worker representatives 
to influence decisions. Some cases had clearer divisions than others between ‘partnership 
forums’ on the one hand, and ‘union-management negotiating bodies’ on the other. In 
Manufacturing C and Hospitality E, management dominated the agenda-setting to a greater 
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extent than at the other firms. The implication in these two cases is a diminished role for 
worker representatives in enabling issues to be raised. Specific examples of the scope of 
issues discussed included new automation in Manufacturing A, C and D, and staffing levels 
and recruitment methods for team members in Manufacturing C. In Financial Services F, 
the partnership forum discussed employment security, with new arrangements giving 
temporary staff opportunities to attain permanent status. In Hospitality E, the partnership 
forum agreed new job-sharing arrangements. Significantly, running alongside partnership 
committees were other union-management mechanisms that would discuss more 
contentious issues, such as changes to pension schemes, pay, and discipline. Some firms 
had a specific policy of discussing such issues outside partnership, while others did not. For 
example, Manufacturing A and C frequently discussed gain-sharing plans in the forum, 
while similar pay and bonus-related issues were deemed ‘industrial relations’ matters at 
Manufacturing B and Financial Services F. 
 
Significantly, robustness of collaborative mutuality was connected not only with formal 
structures but also the informal processes of dialogue between workplace representatives 
and managers. Informal social exchanges served as a conduit to information-exchange and 
consultation owing to a high level of informal dialogue outside formal mechanisms. This 
often meant management and unions would have prior warning of big issues, and informal 
dialogue helped to speed-up decision-making response. Informal dialogue was particularly 
pronounced at Manufacturing A, and a shop steward there remarked how informal dialogue 
was conducted: 
 
“It wouldn’t be that I would be constantly going into an office discussing something 
for an hour with somebody. It would be kind of a general conversation over lunch 
or breakfast or something like that”. 
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Management and union ‘champions’: Our case evidence illustrates that enduring workplace 
pacts require senior management and union ‘champions’ to drive and sustain collaborations 
from the very top on a long-term basis. However, an issue in many organizations today is 
that the most talented senior HR Directors, for example, often stay in posts for shorter 
periods than in the past – and collaboration often relies on continuity. At Manufacturing D, 
for example, the original cadre of senior managers responsible for cooperation all left, and 
some of the replacement managers were less inclined to maintain cooperation when 
confronted by competitive difficulties. Some also preferred unilateral management styles. 
This raises the issue that without succession planning voluntary workplace cooperation is 
vulnerable to collapse when senior management (or union) supporters leave. Mutuality 
subsequently collapsed at Manufacturing D when management were confronted by market 
pressures. In contrast, Manufacturing A has not faced a senior management (or union) 
succession dilemma – most senior supporters of cooperation remained, ensuring continuity 
in top management and union support. The importance of champions was raised in other 
cases. A manager at Manufacturing B commented: 
 
“Really for the partnership to be successful you have to have the leadership 
and that has come from the very top. I would say if you took certain people out 
of the thing the partnership would fall apart”. 
 
In Financial Services F, the senior operations manager similarly explained that multiple 
levels of management were active in partnership forums across the organisation: 
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“Partnership would have the very senior managers from the branch network and 
from [HQ]” 
 
In summary, the evidence depicts the important interplay between multi-level macro and 
micro factors affecting durability of collaborative mutuality. While the extent and 
significance of some factors differ depending on each particular case, they are significant at 
one level or another. The overarching macro-level forces affecting collaborative mutuality 
included exposure to systemic global neo-liberal market forces, which meant that even in 
‘robust’ cases workplace bargains were vulnerable to breach and ultimately, in three cases, 
to collapse. Other macro-level factors were the permissive voluntarist nature of 
employment regulation, which meant that choices about mutuality, in particular whether to 
engage in it or not, were dominated by management. Aligned with minimal regulatory 
constraints from State apparatuses, management tended to opt to consolidate their power 
position rather than share it with other workplace stakeholders. Micro-level factors 
influencing collaboration included: business strategies that sought to differentiate on either 
cost or quality; the use of advanced technology (continuous process technology, for 
example); a balancing of the risks and power distributions necessary for collaboration to 
function; union strength; and long-term presence of both senior management and union 
champions to promote workplace collaboration. However, micro-level factors were 
generally insufficient props against SSD effects. 
 
Table I below summarizes the main features from the six cases in relation to robustness and 
durability. 
 
TABLE I HERE 
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5. Discussion and Future Implications  
Deploying the SSD effects framework, it can be shown that local actors engaging in 
collaborative workplace regimes confront a range of interacting forces: i) unstable 
globalized system effects of neo-liberal capitalist stages of accumulation; ii) societal effects 
promoting voluntary rather than complementary institutional constraints supporting 
workplace mutuality; and iii), effects arising from dominant economies and multinational 
corporations. Drawing on case evidence, this article has advanced three theoretical 
propositions to help explain why workplace mutuality will not typically endure in neo-
liberal market environments. In such contexts, the tensions involved in seeking to balance 
efficiency, equity and voice outcomes will mean that voluntarist workplace partnerships 
seldom endure in the longer-term. 
 
Proposition 1 develops the System effects element of the SSD framework (Smith and 
Meiksins, 1995; Edwards et al., 2013), suggesting that as neo-liberal economies are 
particularly exposed to global market volatility and intensified financialization, there is 
high probability that employers will violate or exit from workplace bargains agreed with 
employees (Thompson, 2013). There were incidents across our cases of managerial 
breaches of explicit bargains with labour; for example in Manufacturing B, C and D, when 
partnership collapsed in the context of serious profit accumulation crises; or in Finance F, 
when management unilaterally transferred part of the business without consultation. To a 
large degree, local management themselves felt unable to support the depth of consultation 
necessary for sustained mutual collaboration, owing to external market forces against which 
they felt relatively powerless.   
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Proposition 2 advanced that the permissive nature of voluntarism, and resultant lack of 
institutional regulation to protect the balance of voice, will inhibit the conditions for 
collaborative mutuality to grow and sustain. The evidence suggests that a ‘light-touch’ 
(minimalist) regulatory regime facilitated excessive employer dominance of the partnership 
agenda. Consequently, workplace collaborative choices are often too dependent on the 
authority and sponsorship of senior management, lacking independent institutional power 
resources. In the absence of external institutional constraints, it is very difficult to balance 
the ‘risks’ and ‘tensions’ underpinning a voluntary equilibrium between management’s 
search for efficiency and employee (union) concerns about equity and voice (Martinez-
Lucio and Stuart, 2005).  
 
Furthermore, evidence related to Proposition 2 is not exclusive to our cases or to the 
societal and institutional context of Ireland. Importantly, similar patterns can be observed in 
other neo-liberal comparative contexts. In the UK, Oxenbridge and Brown (2004: 401) 
concluded that managers and union representatives found that robust cooperative systems 
may be more effective than shallow arrangements, yet were at times difficult to sustain, 
even in economic sectors where trade unionism was deeply embedded. Butler et al., (2011) 
assess cooperative relations when faced with conditions of recession and retrenchment in a 
UK engineering company. The dual factors of union power and (quality-orientated) 
competitive strategy shaped the extent of partnership and managements’ willingness to 
extend decision-making with employees (unions). Similarly, Kochan et al., (2008) report 
on the most comprehensive voluntary labour-management collaboration in North America, 
at Kaiser Permanente, which covers 86,000 employees represented by over thirty local and 
ten national union committees. They emphasize the precariousness of voluntarism as 
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undermining cooperative mutuality, attributable especially to the liberalised US corporate 
governance system. They conclude that partnership is unlikely to proliferate ‘without strong 
buttressing elements from the external environment’ (2008:63). The dedication of 
enlightened management and union leaders in support of collaboration in specific 
organizations will, they argue, not be enough of itself to render mutual gains a more 
enduring phenomenon. This is especially so ‘if the labor movement remains as limited in 
scope and power as it is today, since the option of escaping from union status is available to 
so many employers’ (Kochan et al., 2008:63). 
 
Turning to Proposition 3, workplace practices for mutuality in our case organizations were 
shaped by Dominance effects emanating from the dominant economy of the United States 
and the power of multinational corporations to export more individualised HRM practices. 
All the case organizations (of whatever country origin) had introduced what were viewed as 
‘best practice’ or ‘high-commitment’ type individualist HRM policies in their subsidiaries 
which, in some cases, undermined collectivist structures of employee voice and union 
bargaining. Significantly, dominance effects have been shown to permeate down into our 
case organizations due also to a distinctive unitarist managerial ideology among US-owned 
multinationals: an ideology that eschews collective pluralist mechanisms for collaboration 
such as statutory rights for trade union recognition or legislation ensuring representative-
based works councils; the presence of which might have otherwise provided for more 
robust and enduring workplace mutuality.  
 
The results suggest that organizations configure their workplace employment regimes, 
including HRM practices, in order to reflect their own organizational level contingencies. 
But work regimes are also strongly influenced, yet not determined, by the dynamic 
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interaction of a blend of all three higher level SSD contextual forces; a finding also 
observed by other management scholars (Edwards et al., 2013).  
 
Overall, the evidence presented here lends weight to the argument that mutual collaboration 
between management and labour in the workplace now appears to be largely a chimera in a 
hostile climate of systemic financialized neo-liberal capitalism. Long-standing workplace 
partnerships of the kind hoped for by advocates seem increasingly to reside in the realm of 
fantasy. Revisiting Fox (1979), the endorsement of mutuality as part of a pluralist set of 
values (something that ought to be) is very different to believing that enduring cooperation 
is adequately realizable through existing policies or structures to leverage institutional 
reform (actual practice). State policy promoting workplace collaboration in liberal market 
regimes has focused on encouraging managers to voluntarily design their own practices. On 
closer inspection of such policies, collaboration has been found to be largely devoid of a 
‘balance’ of equity, voice, power and wealth distributing features.  
 
Implications: the future trajectory of workplace mutuality 
With regard to the trajectory for collaborative management-labour partnerships in the future, 
it would appear that the State, employers and unions remain locked into a status quo that 
militates against sustainable mutuality. The labour market trajectories of the State in neo-
liberal regimes like Ireland, the UK, Australia and USA, point towards the continuation of 
light touch regulation. At best, government agencies and employer bodies tend to view 
labour regulations and trade union bargaining as something to be begrudgingly tolerated, or 
worse, as institutional interferences to be aggressively resisted (Gall and Dundon, 2013). 
Regarding the trajectory for employers, the longevity of workplace cooperation is often 
conditional on it adding value to firms. While it cannot be discounted that some 
organizations can grow cooperative mutual gains, such instances are rare under conditions 
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where employers have few constraints on their unitary authority, and the broader political 
economy often favours cost competition as the dominant business model. Put simply, many 
employers assume they do not need cooperative pluralist type arrangements to compete, or 
view the costs as too prohibitive (Godard, 2004; Dobbins and Gunnigle, 2009). If 
collaborative management-labour cooperation is revived as a productive policy goal, there 
would need to be a major cultural and ideological shift in the prevailing managerial mind-
set so that the contested (pluralist) nature of employment relations is recognised and 
understood. Finally, for trade unions, there is an ongoing struggle to address declining 
density and organizational capacity, especially in the private sector. Union organizing may 
be seen as an alternative to partnership, but even this strategy acknowledges barriers given 
limited union resources and power (Simms et al., 2012). Post global-economic crisis, it 
seems probable that unions will become increasingly dependent on employer sponsorship 
for recognition by offering greater concessions to management. Unlike Spanish or German 
unions who demonstrate comparative capacity to leverage work council regulations or 
mobilise through broader political coalitions (see Martinez-Lucio and Connolly, 2012), 
unions in Ireland (and the UK) appear to have side-stepped regulations that may have 
established some representative legitimacy through utilising or campaigning around more 
statutory employee information and consultation regulations (Dundon et al., 2014).  
 
In terms of advancing alternatives to voluntarist mutuality, a possible (partial) response 
would require a European level review of the EU Information & Consultation of 
Employees (ICE) Directive to provide more robust legislation to compel parties to move to 
a more equitable power equilibrium. Indeed, this seems to be what the Directive originally 
envisaged, unlike the present arrangement, which seems to incentivise employers to 
construct minimal voice with little equity. In recent times, EU policy-makers have 
gravitated towards ‘softer’ (voluntaristic) social dialogue edicts and away from harder 
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legislative constraints (Streeck, 2004). Problematically, for public policy, broader 
institutional pathways now appear firmly oriented towards neo-liberal regimes that 
explicitly prioritize economic efficiency of capital accumulation on behalf of big 
corporations, over-and-above concerns among other stakeholders for social equity and 
voice objectives. In explaining the ‘strange non-death of neoliberalism’, Crouch (2011) 
suggests that the dominance effects of giant corporations have intensified, rather than 
abated, after the 2008 financial crisis.   
 
In conclusion, the prognosis for sustainable management-labour collaboration does not look 
positive, especially viewed against the fall-out from the international financial and 
economic crisis. The State and employers are increasingly offloading the burden of risk 
arising from capitalism onto employees - evidenced for example by more precarious 
employment conditions for many workers - which is not conducive to long-term mutuality 
(beyond a small elite of core workers). This article shows that workplace mutuality is likely 
to be constrained and relatively short-lived owing to the interaction of System, Society and 
Dominance effects in liberal market economies. In terms of future management research, 
we would encourage further comparative qualitative methodological analysis of the 
systemic structural causes of workplace and institutional change using the SSD framework, 
and assessment of the implications for different actors regarding the balance between 
efficiency, equity and voice. 
  
 32 
References 
Belanger, J. and Edwards, P. (2007). ‘The Conditions Promoting Compromise in the Workplace’, British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 45, pp. 713-734. 
Boxall, P. (2013). ‘Mutuality and the management of human resources: assessing the quality of 
alignment in employment relations’, Human Resource Management Journal, 23, pp. 1-25.  
Brewster, C., Brookes, M., Johnson, P. and Wood, G. (2014). ‘Direct Involvement, Partnership and 
Setting: A Study in Bounded Diversity’, International Journal of Human Resource Management, 
25, pp. 795-809. 
Budd, J.W. (2004). Employment with a Human Face. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press. 
Butler, P., Glover, L. and Tregaskis, O. (2011). ‘When the Going Gets Tough...Recession and the 
Resilience of Workplace Partnership’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 49, pp. 666-687. 
Collings, D.G., Gunnigle, P. and Morley, M.J. (2008). ‘Between Boston and Berlin: American 
MNCs and the shifting contours of industrial relations in Ireland’, International Journal of 
Human Resource Management, 19, pp. 240-261. 
Cullinane, N. and Dundon, T. (2006), ‘The psychological contract: a critical review’, International 
Journal of Management Reviews, 8, pp. 113-129. 
Cullinane, N., Donaghey, J., Dundon, T., Dobbins, T. and Hickland, E. (2014). ‘Regulating for 
Mutual Gains: Non-Union Employee Representation and the Information & Consultation 
Directive’, International Journal of Human Resource Management, 25, pp. 810-828. 
Conway, N., Kiefer, T., Hartley, J. and Briner, R.B. (2014). ‘Doing More with Less? Employee Reactions 
to Psychological Contract Breach via Target Similarity or Spillover during Public Sector 
Organizational Change’, British Journal of Management, 29, pp. 737-754. 
Crouch, C. (2011). The Strange Non-death of Neoliberalism. Chichester: Wiley. 
Danford, A., Durbin, S., Richardson, M., Stewart, P. and Tailby, S. (2014). ‘Workplace partnership 
and professional workers: ‘about as useful as a chocolate teapot’?’, International Journal of 
Human Resource Management, 25, pp. 879-894. 
Delbridge, R., Hauptmeier, M. and Sengupta, S. (2011). ‘Beyond the enterprise: Broadening the 
horizons of International HRM’, Human Relations, 64, pp. 483-505. 
Dobbins, T. (2010), ‘The case for beneficial constraints: why permissive voluntarism impedes 
workplace cooperation in Ireland’, Economic and Industrial Democracy, 31, pp. 497-519. 
Dobbins, T. and Gunnigle, P. (2009), ‘Can voluntary workplace partnership deliver sustainable mutual 
gains?’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 47, pp. 546-570. 
Dundon T. and Collings, D. (2011), ‘Employment Relations in the United Kingdom and Republic of 
Ireland’, in M. Barry and A. Wilkinson (eds), Research Handbook of Comparative Employment 
Relations, Edward Elgar: London. 
Dundon, T., Dobbins, T., Hickland, E., Cullinane, N. and Donaghey, J. (2014), ‘Employer occupation 
of regulatory space for the Employee Information and Consultation (I&C) Directive in Liberal 
Market Economies’, Work Employment and Society, 28, pp. 21-39. 
Edwards, P. K., Lécute, R., Tregaskis, O., Levesque, C., McDonnell, A. and Quintanilla, J. (2013). 
‘Human resource management practices in the multinational company: a test of system, societal, 
and dominance effects’, Industrial & Labor Relations Review, 66, pp. 588-617. 
Fox A. (1979). ‘A note on industrial relations pluralism’, Sociology, 13, pp. 105-109.  
Gall, G. and Dundon, T. (2013). Global Anti-Unionism: Nature, Dynamics, Trajectories and Outcomes. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 33 
Godard, J. (2004). ‘A Critical Assessment of the High-Performance Paradigm’, British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 42, pp. 349-378. 
Guest, D. and Peccei, R. (2001). ‘Partnership at Work: mutuality and the balance of advantage’, British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 39, pp. 207-236. 
Gunnigle, P. (1995). ‘Collectivism and the management of industrial relations in greenfield sites’, 
Human Resource Management Journal, 5, pp. 24-40. 
Gunnigle, P. (1998). ‘More Rhetoric than Reality: Enterprise Level Industrial Relations Partnerships in 
Ireland’, Economic and Social Review, 28, pp. 179-200. 
Hancke, B., Rhodes, M. and Thatcher, M. (2007). Beyond Varieties of Capitalism: conflict, 
contradictions, and complementarities in the European economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hauptmeier, M. and Vidal, M. (2014). Comparative Political Economy of Work. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Houlder, V., Boland, V. and Politi, J. (2014). ‘Tax avoidance: the Irish inversion’, Financial Times ( 29th 
April). 
Johnstone, S. (2014), ‘Workplace Partnership’. In A. Wilkinson, J. Donaghey, T. Dundon and R. 
Freeman (Eds), Handbook of Research on Employee Voice. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Johnstone, S. and Ackers, P. (2014). ‘Partnership at Work and Mutual Gains’. In Guest, D. and Needle, D. 
ed. Encyclopaedia of Human Resource Management. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.  
Johnstone, S, Wilkinson, A. and Ackers, P. (2010), ‘Applying Budd’s model to partnership’, 
Economic and Industrial Democracy, 32, pp. 307-328 
Kaufman, B. (2014). ‘Theorizing Determinants of Employee Voice: An Integrative Model Across 
Disciplines and Levels of Analysis’, Human Resource Management Journal – forthcoming.  
Kochan, T., Adler, P., McKersie, R., Eaton, A., Segal, P. and Gerhart, P. (2008). ‘The potential and 
precariousness of partnership: the case of the Kaiser Permanente Labour Management Partnership’, 
Industrial Relations, 47, pp. 36–66. 
Marchington, M. (2015), ‘Analysing the forces shaping employee involvement and participation 
(EIP) at organisation level in liberal market economies (LMEs)’, Human Resource Management 
Journal, 25, pp. 1-18. 
Martinez-Lucio, M. and Stuart, M. (2005). ‘Partnership and New Industrial Relations in a Risk Society: 
An age of shotgun weddings and marriages of convenience’, Work, Employment and Society, 19, pp. 
797-817. 
Martinez-Lucio, M. and Connolly, H. (2012). ‘Transformation and Continuities in Urban Studies: 
Urban Politics, Trade Unions and Migration in Spain’, Urban Studies, 49, pp. 669-684.  
McDonough, T. and Dundon, T. (2010), ‘Thatcherism Delayed? The Irish crisis and the paradox of 
social partnership’, Industrial Relations Journal, 41, pp. 544-562 
McDonough, T., Reich, M. and Kotz D.M., (Eds) (2010). Contemporary Capitalism and its Crises: 
Social Structure of Accumulation Theory, Cambridge University Press. 
McLaughlin, C. (2013). ‘The role of productivity coalitions in building a ‘high road’ competitive 
strategy: The case of Denmark and Ireland’, European Journal of Industrial Relations, 19, pp. 
127-143. 
Murray, G., Belanger, J., Giles, A. and Lapointe, P.A. (2002). Work & Employment Relations in the 
High-Performance Workplace. Continuum: London and NY. 
Oxenbridge, S. and Brown, W. (2004). ‘Achieving a new equilibrium? The stability of cooperative 
employer-union relationships’, Industrial Relations Journal, 35, pp. 388-402. 
Rittau, Y. and Dundon, T. (2010), ‘The roles and functions of shop stewards in workplace partnership: 
evidence from the Republic of Ireland’, Employee Relations, 32, pp. 10-27. 
 34 
Roche, W.K. (2007). ‘Social Partnership and Workplace Regimes in Ireland’, Industrial Relations 
Journal, 38, pp. 188-209.  
Roche, W.K. (2013). ‘After the Ball is Over: Accounts of the Functioning and Breakdown of Social 
Partnership’, in W.K. Roche (eds.), The Labour Relations Commission and its Times. Dublin: Labour 
Relations Commission. 
Roche, W.K. and Teague, P. (2014). ‘Successful but unappealing: fifteen years of workplace 
partnership in Ireland’, International Journal of Human Resource Management, 25, pp. 781-794. 
Scullion, H., Collings, D. and Gunnigle, P (2007). ‘International human resource management in 
the 21st century: emerging themes and contemporary debates’, Human Resource Management 
Journal, 17, pp. 309-319. 
Simms, M., Holgate, J. and Heery, E. (2012). Union Voices: Tactics and Tensions in UK 
Organizing. Ithaca: ILR Press. 
Smith, C. and Meiksins, P. (1995). ‘System, Society and Dominance Effects in Cross-National 
Organizational Analysis’, Work Employment and Society, 9, pp. 241-67. 
Streeck, W. (1997). ‘Beneficial constraints: on the economic limits of rational voluntarism’, in J. 
Hollingsworth, J. Rogers and R. Boyer (eds.), Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of 
Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Streeck, W. (2004). ‘Educating capitalists: a rejoinder to Wright and Tsakalotos’, Socio-Economic Review, 
2, pp. 425-37. 
Stewart, J. (2013). ‘Is Ireland a Tax Haven?’, IIIS Discussion Paper No. 430, Institute for International 
Integration Studies, Trinity College Dublin.  
Thompson, P. (2013). ‘Financialization and the workforce: extending and applying the disconnected 
capitalism thesis’, Work, Employment and Society, 27, pp. 472-488. 
Wilkinson, A., Dundon, T., Townsend, K. and Donaghey, J. (2014). ‘Partnership, Collaboration and 
Mutual Gains: evaluating context, interests and legitimacy’, International Journal of Human 
Resource Management, 25, pp. 737–747. 
Witcher, B.J. and Chau, V.S. (2012). ‘Varieties of Capitalism and Strategic Management: Managing 
Performance in Multinationals after the Global Financial Crisis’, British Journal of 
Management, 23, pp. 58-73. 
Wood, G. and Budhwar, P. (2014). ‘Advancing Theory and Research and the British Journal of 
Management’, British Journal of Management, 25, pp. 1-3.  
Wood, G., Dibben, P. and Ogden, S. (2014). ‘Comparative Capitalism without Capitalism, and 
Production without Workers: The Limits and Possibilities of Contemporary Institutional 
Analysis’. International Journal of Management Reviews, 16, pp. 384–396. 
 
 
 
  
 35 
Table 1 – Robustness and durability of collaborative mutuality 
 
Company Size Union Density Robust-Shallow 
Durability 
Durability related features 
Manufacturing A 555 70% (100% of 
industrial 
workforce) 
Robust, Enduring High ‘institutionalization’ of collaboration; 
informal dialogue; relative insulation from 
market pressures; collaborative 
‘champions’; capital intensive continuous 
process plant. 
Manufacturing B 1600 100% Collapsed 2005 
Reconstituted 2008 
Power and risk dis-equilibrium; conflicts 
of interest; insufficient institutionalization. 
Management dominated agenda. 
Manufacturing C 85 100% Collapsed Management dominated agenda. Exposed 
to competitive pressures, profit crisis. 
Manufacturing D 500 95% Collapsed High exposure to market forces; not deeply 
institutionalized; ‘champions’ left. 
Hospitality E 480 75% Shallow Management dominated agenda. 
Collaboration not deeply institutionalized. 
Finance F 600 94% Partially Robust Unilateral transfer of undertakings process 
(union excluded). Breach of trust. 
 
 
